Monday, December 12, 2011

Staying Ahead of the Game - An Interview with Winchester Knights' Daniel Wakefield

by Stefano Lenza


In a revealing exclusive, reporter Stefano Lenza spoke with Daniel Wakefield, men's captain of Winchester University's Basketball Firsts - nicknamed the Winchester Knights. He speaks candidly about the stresses and strains of leading the team, as well as the pride he takes in overseeing one of their most progressive periods for years.
Click on the link below to listen to the documentary project and find out more.


Shooting for the stars...





Sound effects credited, with thanks, to the following:

Monday, October 31, 2011

A Day in the Life... of a Conker

One glorious autumn day, a young photographer noticed a group of small children playing amongst the vibrant leaves strewn across the park. He saw that they were collecting conkers, hoarding them in plastic bags, buckets and pockets, and he was suddenly thrown back into those blustery mornings on the school playground.
What must it be like to see the autumnal world from within one of those tiny shells?
Our young photographer decided to find out. This is what he saw...




Morning high: this horse chestnut tree's new crop looks down on the early passers-by.


Grounded: one conker plummets to earth, finally breaking free of its outer shell.


Palm life: but it's brother is snatched from home...


... and the hands of fate begin to tighten...


... before at last the puppet is put to work...


Is autumn so glorious now...?

Friday, May 6, 2011

And in Conclusion...

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the last book of the module and poses as something rather different in comparison to the others. It's very much an economical account of Wittgenstein's basic propositions, individually setting out and developing all seven of them in his own pursuit of philosophy's logical conclusions.

Looking at several more closely, it seems to me that no other studied philosopher was as fundamentally influenced by the analytic nature of science. Reading the book took me back to those painstakingly slow days in the school labs, noting down my observations and expanding upon them to arrive (sooner or later) at some enlightening evaluation. Perhaps with the exception of the shorter first and last propositions, each one demonstrates a meticulous 'breaking down' of reality itself, whereby the existence of its constituent parts is then explained, possibly becoming broken down even further.

The proposition that most interested me was the third, which stated 'The logical picture of the facts is the thought'. This section revisits some of the issues addressed in Kant's philosophy, particularly alluding towards the topic of phenomena and noumena. To Wittgenstein's mind, the 'existence' of noumena is impossible. He argued that if a human being has the potential to imagine something, then by logic the something must be possible, as thoughts themselves may be considered 'factual' simply due to their very existence within our mental reality. Therefore, in opposition to what Kant proposed, nothing can be unknowable and everything is phenomenal.

As previously discussed, Wittgenstein greatly believed in the influence of language and its role in interpreting and solving the philosophical conundrums that have blighted the brightest minds for millenia, since the time of Socrates. However, his statement as part of the third proposition that language cannot contradict logic seems somewhat bold, through its implication that human beings must therefore represent perfection, considering language as a manmade phenomenon. Nonetheless, I agree that many philosophical debates can almost seem to become lost in translation, seeing as language is so flexible and multifaceted. As the book argues, names themselves cannot be analysed in the search for meaning - they tell us how a thing is, not what it is. They are 'primitive signs', which when incorrectly applied to a certain context, allow true meaning to become misconstrued.

So, without language, History and Context of Journalism could not exist, or else we'd have no debates to discuss! But of course, nor could any other module and here lies the crux of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Language is our method for communicating the world to each other, which by his logic, means language itself is a constituent part of our reality. Nor, however, is language a single entity - it represents many entities - and as the Tractatus states, any single thing, in isolation, is unimportant, but the possibility of many things reveals something about the world and its nature. Therefore, the possibility and the subsequent existence of language, reveals it to be of considerable significance to the past, present and future of man's own existence.

His book, like so many before it, rocked the boat of philosophy - no less for its somewhat openly presumptuous manner in presenting the views of the author as fact. But that's what all philosophers aim to achieve, (as we've so often seen). Each harbours a desire to stamp their own signature on the evolution of human understanding, to present their own arguments and ideas for 'unknotting' the complexities of the subject. And I get the impression that we'll be arguing for some time yet - History and Context will be going strong for years to come.

And in conclusion, I'll just point to the concluding line of the Tractatus; even Wittgenstein, it would seem, acknowledged that language cannot always convey the absolute truth of the universe...

'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent'.

Saturday, April 30, 2011

The Power of Language

As we approach the final bends of the module, the interconnectivity between some of our philosophical theories and the practice of modern day journalism is becoming more and more apparent. No more so than when we consider the explorations of our latest philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein.

The Austrian's most celebrated work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, is one of the first book-length studies concerning the relationship between philosophy and language. Published in German in 1921, Wittgenstein argued that all philosophical propositions could be categorised as simple statements conveyed through a set of socially appreciated codes, (i.e. language), which may be analysed as such according only to our existing linguistic structures. From my point of view, he effectively revisits the ontological question; do absolute truths exist in the universe? To use what is in all likelihood a poor analogy, our understanding of the universe is like viewing life through a pair of tinted glasses - everything we learn is derived from our mode of communication, which itself conveys a certain viewpoint upon the propositions that we present. After all, language is a manmade phenomenon, and so all our knowledge must therefore pertain to some form of 'manmadeness' too.

Indeed, Wittgenstein goes so far as to say that the world is language. It's influence is evident on every aspect of our lives and here lies the key idea of the Tractatus, very much reminiscent of Ayer's verification principle; if something, (be it abstract or concrete), cannot be rendered in language, then it cannot exist in the first place.

Naturally, language and subsequently, the politics of language, are vital to the profession of journalism. Wittgenstein's theory on the power of language may in fact be exemplified by its ability to influence (and even control) a population. The Tractatus suggests that the control of facts results in the control of the world, thus potentially serving to explain the rising impact of the modern media on social life. Journalists can mould public opinion, they can access our lives on a number of levels through newspapers, radio and television, the Internet, etc, etc. Of course, to harp back to Nazism, (though I'm no way likening our media to the regime of a dictatorship), Hitler more or less gained possession of German thinking through his stirring, powerful speeches and omnipresent propaganda.

So the Austrian philosopher's theories were put into practice a mere decade after publication. Another man who demonstrated a fascination with language, perhaps like no other journalist did, was George Orwell, particularly so in his 1949 novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four.

Orwell was a disillusioned socialist and anti-communist, as proven in much of his work. Nineteen Eighty-Four follows the story of a society that has been gripped and utterly transformed by a Hitler-esque figure, entirely through the active application of fear within the mind of each citizen and the constant manipulation of words. 'Newspeak', as Orwell names it, not only reconfigures the mindset and beliefs of the dystopia's citizens, (as Nazism did), but also seems to alter reality. 'Doublethink' exemplifies this, which describes the state of believing in two contradictory statements at once. We see then, that langauge does, indeed, control our perceptions of the universe. What is right, wrong or ridiculous is decided by a set of codes that we ourselves determine.

Much of today's advertising is also Orwellian in its nature, loaded with subliminal messaging that is designed to shape our opinions to fit a physchological need for the promoted product or service. Big Brother is not just one person, sitting on a high throne in a remote palace. He is society, himself omnipresent. He is language.

Wednesday, April 13, 2011

A.J. Ayer and 'The Function of Philosophy'

One of the major pieces of philosophical work of the twentieth century was that of Alfred Jules Ayer, entitled Language, Truth and Logic. Published in 1936, it resembles the formality of a manifesto belonging to the Vienna Circle, which was broken apart shortly before by the emerging Nazi party. The book is recognised as the first significant work to introduce the English-speaking world to logical positivism and, what the school called, the 'verification principle'.

The principle, to my mind, encapsulates the relentless, mechanical logic of the philosophy, stating that no sentence containing a 'formally true proposition' or an 'empirical hypothesis' is 'literally significant', thereby justifying its dismissal as to the use of tenuous metaphysics. Indeed, Ayer dedicates the entirety of his first chapter to the dissemination of metaphysics and its subsequently senseless association with the 'department of logic' that is philosophy. He analyses this ancient misinterpretation as a presupposition of linguistic statements as unequivocal facts. In other words, there has been a shift in the definition of key terms and their real, original meanings, resulting in a loss of understanding through effective mistranslations. It becomes clear to readers that the study of linguistics itself is vital to the school in its attempts to clarify what Ayer calls the 'function' of philosophy.

In his preface, the writer acknowledges that all philosophical propositions are necessary and carry a significance that eliminates any disregard for any credible school of thought. It seems Ayer is attempting heroically to unite the differences between philosophers over thousands of years, which have themselves caused uproar in what may be described as 'the war of philosophy'. From Plato and Aristotle, to Locke, Rousseau and to Nietzsche, their separate thoughts and ideas should be defined by a single cause, namely the need for their profession not to be deductive or speculative, but conversely critical.

According to the following chapter, which explores the issue in more detail, philosophy must also be distinguished from the empirical nature of science, nor does it concern an area of knowledge that lies 'beyond the scope' of empirics. All experience, from Ayer's point of view, is or can be brought under scientific law. As a result, philosophers merely aim to determine the validity of scientific procedures and discoveries, presenting us with the bare facts that may or may not determine our own opinions. Crucially, it should not seek to enquire whether an individual philosophical interpretation is a truth, but which forms of interpretation are most logical. For example, Ayer refers to the philosophy of Descartes, which was founded upon intuitive certainties, in order to negate self-contradictions, (exemplified by the cogito, 'I think, therefore I am'). However, logical positivism would argue, according to the verification principle, that even intuition is not a certainty. Kierkegaard also criticised Descartes, stating he was simply furthering the assumptions of the term, 'I', and its ability to think. Here, we see the outlook of a logical positivist, concerning oneself with the complexities and implications of linguistic statements. In addition, the book itself regards the argument of Hume, echoing that no one event can intrinsically point to the next. Thus, Ayer here sides with the Principle of Uniformity of Nature, belonging to the eighteenth century Scot.

Logical positivism then seems intent on collapsing the contradictions of previous philosophers, seemingly reigniting the purpose of philosophy altogether. Ayer's nonchalance towards the long-disputed 'problem of induction' is typical of this revolutionary thinking, stating that the problem has 'no solution' that satisfies all principles (both formal and empirical) and so it cannot, literally, be a 'genuine' problem.

It seems to me that Ayer believes the revelations of logical positivism make the school unique. But is that not what every philosophy believes? Additionally, the book would appear to imply that all philosophies convey some form of truth, simply due to their existence as 'philosophies'. This in turn suggests that one may conceivably choose to believe in one school over another, however, Ayer seems adamant, like previous philosophers, that logical positivism provides all answers (that are as close to factual truth as is possible) to the aforementioned 'war of philosophy'. Indeed, chapter 2 mentions that philosophy should not seek to 'reassure', but this seems exactly what logical positivism is trying to achieve.

I may be cynical and I am not saying that the school is alone in being hypocritical and contradictory. In fact, I still think all schools are to some degree. So, unfortunately, from my point of view, Ayer may have introduced several more interesting theories and takes on philosophical questions, but he has found no lasting resolution as to what makes one school essentially more 'true' than the next.

Thursday, March 31, 2011

Secrets of the Vienna Circle

It sounds like the self-confessed antagonistic society of the next Dan Brown installment, soon to be hitting the shelves of a bookstore near you. However, the Vienna Circle is anything but.

In 1922, German philosopher, Moritz Schlick took charge of a series of long-standing meetings at the University of Vienna, which had begun nearly two decades before, between some of the brightest European minds on science and mathematics. Indeed, the main focus of the meetings was to debate the emerging discoveries and theories of physics, in particular, those of a certain Albert Einstein. The organisation became formerly known as the Circle under Schlick's guidance and set to discussing the philosophical implications of the twentieth century scientific revolutions. From these discussions was born a new school of philosophy that went on to profoundly influence ethical thought for the following decades: logical positivism.

Loosely defined as a school that combines empirical and rationalist views to deduce the relevance of mathematical and linguistic logic in epistemology, logical positivism rejected many of philosophy's previous doctrines. This in many ways reflects the ideology of modernism and that of Nietzsche, radicalising philosophy by dismissing widely accepted beliefs. For example, theories regarding the existence of God and the nature of history were disregarded as meaningless to the well-being of mankind. Thus, I think the school also partly incorporates the existentialist mentality towards actively rebelling against social dogma.

Philosophy, according to the Circle, should not itself be a doctrine for interpreting the world, but a method of scientific interpretation. In a way therefore, it was merely a means of assisting science and the discoveries that it seemed continuously now to be making. Such discoveries involved challenging a set or several sets of previously held facts. Here lies the key to scientific revolution; new theories occasionally contradict not only our beliefs, but universally acknowledged truths. The most famous, of course, was the discovery that Planet Earth was not flat at all - and indeed, as Sinatra famously sung, 'they all laughed at Christopher Columbus when he said the world was round!' In Thomas Kuhn's book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), challenging basic assumptions is referred to as a 'paradigm shift'. Logical positivsm acknowledged that science always has a new theory or concept to discover, which will either challenge the previous paradigm, or lend to developing it. The thought that we, as a race, will never fully understand the world around us is a sad, but also somehow comforting one. After all, where would we go if we knew all there was to know? Humans thrive on striving for new bounds and learning new answers to life's mysteries - why else would we be at university!

Perhaps the most significant strand of logical positivism is the study of meta-ethics, which tackles the question: Can moral claims be true or false?

Those who answer no, are non-cognitivists, believing that moral claims are not statements and so cannot be right or wrong. They may be split into three categories of emotivism (moral claims are just expressions of emotions), prescriptivism (moral claims are mere reasons for action) and expressivism (moral claims are simply one's expressions of widely accepted social norms).

Conversely, those who answer yes, are cognitivists, believing that they are in fact individual statements that specifically reflect the nature of our personalities. They too may be split into three categories of subjectivism (moral claims are true if the individual truly believes in them), intersubjectivism (moral claims are true if the wider community accepts them) and objectivism (moral claims are only true if they are independent of any preferences). This, in turn, raises the question: Are there any truly objective moral values? If you think so, you are an objective moral realist. If not, you are an objective anti-realist, believing all moral claims are false because we as a society assume a set of moral codes, (i.e. what is right and what is wrong), which is a manmade phenomenon and so does not truly exist.

From my point of view, I agree with this last statement. Unless a believer in the Bible, which states that morals are derived from the Divine Ten Commandments, then one must surely agree that mankind itself judges what is right and wrong, underlined by the alternate laws that govern separate societies. Such freedom of will was tragically exemplified by the hijackers of 9/11, who sincerely believed that the West was their sworn enemy and that they were to die for 'the right' cause. In their minds, they were 'freedom fighters'. To us, the West, they were terrorists and committed an act of monstrosity.

Therein lie the problems that face the world today.

Friday, March 18, 2011

The 'me generation' of the 60s

The last week has seen something of a transition from the philosophical ideals of existentialism to the new literary form of writing, known as 'New Journalism'. In fact, it is possible to see a correlation between the emergence of blossoming existentialist writers, like Camus, and the increasing popularity in newspaper feature writing during the middle of the twentieth century.

Firstly, a word on the French existentialist, Jean-Paul Sartre. Perhaps the most revealing aspects of his philosophy lay in his ontological definitions of the world. He divided physical presences into three categories: things in themselves, things for themselves and things for others. The first group of objects are indeterminate, as they are subject to constant change through decay, thus including everyday objects such as apples, books and even houses, (among countless others of course). This group also incorporates living specimens like flowers and trees, although are distinguished from the second, in that they are not self determining or self thinking. In other words, the second category refers to people themselves. The latter group consists also of living 'things', but those that live and exist only for the benefit of their superiors, not for themselves. For example, slaves living in the eighteenth century may have been considered part of this final band, as were wives treated as subordinates to their husbands before the emergence of the feminist movement.

In my view, there may be some contradictions, (or to put it more politely, overlaps), in Sartre's divisions. Surely the concept of death signifies that human beings (whether considered to be of an inferior or superior social standing) are 'finite' too? And in my case, a good apple serves no better purpose than satisfying my own hunger, so surely these are the things which truly exist only 'for our own benefit'? Needless to say, everything rots and dies eventually, so perhaps it would be more suitable to place every conceivable phenomenon in the first bracket, before then splitting them into their own sub-categories.

Ironically, despite these potentially brash stereotypes, the outlandish beliefs of existentialism may be credited with fostering a new social interest in challenging prejudicial views previously held on homosexuals, ethnic minorities, etc. Existentialist, Simone de Beauvoir, for example, became known as one of the first outspoken feminists of the last century. She was infamously, in fact, one of Sartre's many lovers. Her book, The Second Sex, argued that one was not born a woman, but 'became' one, through the subconsciously accepted social structures that framed male and female relationships.

Indeed, it manifested itself into a sort of cultural movement, particularly in France and the USA, where it gave birth to the New Left of social activists, perhaps most often associated with the 'Hippie Movement' of the sixties. Freedom of speech became increasingly important in the New World and this concept quickly gathered momentum in the profession of journalism - the eyes and ears of the public. Liberal theories in freedom of the press were developed, thus giving rise to yet another 'New'... New Journalism.

And so we come full circle. As discussed in the previous post, New Journalism promoted unique takes upon news reporting, which allowed writers to openly express an opinion within the media and readers to gain a variety of perspectives that broadened their own understanding. Today, 'Gonzo Journalism', (as it has become more recently known, coined by editor Bill Cardoso in 1970), is not only limited to print media. The documentary, 'Supersize Me' of 2004, was pointed out in this week's seminar. But there are also examples of investigative reporting on radio and in the cinema, such as in the 2009 film, 'Brothers at War'. The director, Jake Rademacher, follows his brother into the war in Iraq, documenting the profound experiences of both themselves and their family back home.

Each of these examples contains very different subject matter, but their origins and production are very similar. In each case, the journalist leaves his comfort zone, going out into the field to actually witness and, most importantly, live the story. This is, I believe, the most important ideal that the genre has given birth to. And modern critics may point at Gonzo Journalism as another offshoot of tabloidisation, which serves only in sensationalising a story (be it hard or soft news). But then, as audiences, don't we crave a little drama every now and again...?

Thursday, March 17, 2011

Seminar Paper - Tom Wolfe's 'The New Journalism' (1973)

Tom Wolfe is an American author and journalist, who moved to New York City in 1962, where he became employed by the publication, New York Herald Tribune. His book, The New Journalism, is split in two parts. The first is a manifesto and the second is an anthology of exemplary literary pieces that effectively illustrates part one, compiled by himself and editor, Edward Warren Johnson.

The phrase, ‘New Journalism’, refers to a form of writing that was born and developed during the sixties. It favours not the traditional conventions of dispassionate reporting, but rather the incorporation of narrative techniques, (most often found in the novel), into investigative journalism. Part one of Wolfe’s book, on which this seminar paper will focus, explores New Journalism’s emergence, his own employment of the form and its significance to Sixties American culture.

The first chapter explores his arrival in the City, describing the state of journalism early in the decade. Wolfe admits to a disappointment at the apparent lack of ambition within the field, both in his professional environment – as he compares the office to ‘the receiving bin at the Good Will’ (pp.16) – and in his future prospects. Many sixties journalists shared no interest in internal promotion. Instead, they competed amongst one another for a different purpose.

These journalists Wolfe refers to as ‘feature writers’, who worked largely for Sunday Supplements, contributing human interest stories and quirky anecdotes to the paper. Unlike ‘scoop reporters’, who dealt in ‘hard news’ that was usually politically based, feature writers sought to portray their pieces with a narrative verging on fiction. To them, journalism itself was simply a stepping stone towards what Wolfe calls their ‘final triumph’, which was the novel (pp.17).

As he acknowledges, since the latter half of the nineteenth century, the novel was perceived as the highest form of literature, which enabled the author to express his or her unquestionable maturity and understanding of the world. Here we begin to note the supposed hierarchy of writing, which arguably still exists today. Early novelists like Dickens, Twain and Bronte are still revered as celebrities of the literary world and their work remains the canon of English and American education. In comparison, the tabloidization of newspapers over recent decades has somewhat scarred the reputation of the so-called scoop reporters, due to growing trends in exaggeration and sensationalism that blurs the distinction between gossip and ‘real life’.

Thus, although a competitive environment would have proved beneficial to the quality of newspaper features during the time, it is perhaps indicative that writing was (and still may be) a conceited profession. However, as Wolfe states himself, this pursuit of the ‘final triumph’ is comparable with the American Dream, which is itself founded upon a striving simply to become the best one can be.

As a result, as the sixties wore on, feature writing became more popular and chapter two describes the way in which articles began to develop into fully fledged pieces of literary non-fiction. They were often characterised by descriptive scenes that conveyed the story to readers, which were subsequently connected by expository passages that were more journalistically conventional. For example, Guy Talese’s ‘The soft psyche of Joshua Logan’ (from the anthology), opens with; ‘The theatre lights dimmed, and the jewels in the audience sparkled like a city seen at night from an airplane…’ (pp.81). Having set the scene, Talese begins the next passage of his piece by placing the narrative in context, stating ‘and so here he was, in the Fall of 1962, stung successively by three critical flops…’ (pp.81).

By employing various literary devices, such as imagery, writers like Talese were given licence to put their own personal stamp on the story in question. Previously, columns and editorials were the only real vehicles for expressing opinion and these were only handed to distinguished reporters. Feature writing allowed journalists this rare opportunity to ‘go outside’ and find a good, interesting story and be able to approach it entirely subjectively (pp.25). Today, this may seem an ordinary procedure; however, Wolfe claims that in 1963 it was ‘unheard of among newspaper columnists’ (pp.25). New Journalism may partly be credited, therefore, with modern journalistic practices of actively interacting with the subject. Indeed, during the sixties these varied from joining the army and participating in training, to shadowing the infamous Hell’s Angels.

Wolfe notes one particular journalist from the Herald Tribune, Jimmy Breslin, who would gather copious amounts of background material in order to accurately portray his ‘characters’ and give them ‘life’. Wolfe is attempting to prove to his readers the effort that goes into each individual piece of feature writing, dispelling the myth of ‘flashes [of]… creativity’ that once drew the line between journalism and fictional novels (pp.27). He presents us with the ‘death of the novel’ and the resulting shock that this caused to the traditional ‘class structure’ of writing. This pyramid consisted of, at its very peak, novelists and poets, then came the essayists and historians, followed lastly by the journalists. Sunday Supplement writers, like Wolfe himself, were not considered to be ‘in the game’ and so their sudden use of all three of the other forms’ techniques was deeply disturbing to the literary world (pp.39).

In many ways, the emergence of New Journalism may be compared to a form of social revolution that Marx himself sought; namely, the liquidation of all ‘classes’ of literature into a single solution. Certainly, this style of writing differed in both discourse and content.

Point of view was vital to the art and Wolfe would even place himself in some of his articles to experiment with different narrative perspectives. He also states that subjectivity or objectivity becomes irrelevant if the narrator’s voice is too understated. The writer should assume the position of a man witnessing his or her protagonist in action and immerse the piece in the surrounding culture, (for example, taking up the dialect of the subject’s region). This Wolfe calls the ‘downstage voice’ (pp.32). In any case, he did not want to sound ‘like a radio announcer at a tennis match’ (pp.31).

In terms of content, Wolfe argues that Sixties America will later be defined not by its political events, but by its morals towards the counter culture, the ‘death of God’ and so on. Audiences or ‘consumers’ wanted the framing of social realism to change; there was a new fascination with surrealism and Freudian theories and New Journalism exploited this, unlike the novelists, who seemed to limit their interests to the likes of space exploration and the on-going war in Vietnam. Pop culture and drug use were common issues that feature writing explored, accounting largely for its sudden explosion in popularity during a decade labelled the ‘Swinging Psychedelic Sixties’.

The final chapter of part one lays out Wolfe’s four essential devices that characterise any piece of New Journalism. Wolfe argues that this feature writing gave the literary form ‘immediacy… concrete reality… [and] emotional involvement’, achieved firstly through ‘scene-by-scene construction’ (pp.46). As opposed to earlier examples, such as that of Talese in 1963, articles eventually evolved into legitimate ‘short stories’, which were developed narratively by the direct transition from one scene to another, without use of the previously employed expository passage. This can be seen in another of the anthology’s articles, ‘Gear’, written by Richard Goldstein in 1969. The opening paragraph begins with, ‘Too early to get up, especially on Saturday. The sun peeks over his windowsill’, before the next starts, ‘In the bathroom he breaks three screaming pimples’ (pp.96). Unlike the previous article, there is no explanation, between scenes, from an external narrator as to what is happening, which furthers the impression of this piece of journalism as a fictional story in its own right.

Secondly, any dialogue must be recorded in full, avoiding paraphrasing as much as possible so as to present a strong sense of character, while the story should also be told through the third-person point of view, as demonstrated by Goldstein. In comparison to conventional journalism, which is usually conveyed through the first-person (i.e. the reporter), this allows readers into the story of every character and so portrays several different perspectives.

Finally, in order also to convey an accurate account, the fourth device states that the writer must symbolise what Wolfe calls the ‘status life’ of the protagonist. Every physical aspect, every mannerism, every significant relationship must be used in building a subtle image of the subject of the piece. In ‘Gear’, Goldstein tells readers of the relationship the protagonist shares with his mother, as well as what personality she may have, through simple descriptions and actions; ‘He walks past… where his mother sleeps in a gauzy hairnet, the covers pulled over her chin, her baby feet swathed in yellow calluses… He mutters silently at her’ (pp.97).

According to Wolfe, this creates ‘an atmosphere as rich and involving as the Joycean use of point of view’ (pp.48). It is, however, built on the assumption that these pictures trigger the reader’s memories of his or her own status life, which may, I think, be the most difficult effect to achieve within such a short body of writing. Joyce’s famous sub-conscious narrative is an incredibly extensive work, which intends to progressively absorb the reader into the protagonist’s mind-set and thus form a close understanding of the character through this textual relationship. In a piece of feature writing, usually no more than several thousand words, the journalist faces an arduous and arguably impossible task of emulating such a bond.

Clearly though, New Journalism has opened new possibilities and exciting prospects for budding writers. Ironically, many now turn to this form of literature over the staling novel, unlike those journalists working for the Sunday Supplements before the sixties arrived. Readers, the most important people to writers, seek original takes on the art form, as well as unique material. Wolfe concludes that this is due to the human mind craving constant interaction with fellow ‘status lives’ and this may be true, for as the science of anthropology has sought to prove, we each ‘develop and survive’ according to the society that we live in (pp.48).

Friday, March 4, 2011

The Absurdist: Albert Camus

This week we concentrated on the work of Algerian writer and philosopher, Albert Camus. His novella, The Stranger, first published in English in 1946, follows the adult life of protagonist, Meursault.

The most prevalent theme in my eyes is death. The story opens with Meursault receiving a letter to attend his mother's funeral, after which, a chain of everyday events unfolds, leading to him killing an Arab man while on the beach with his friends and ultimately resulting in his own execution. So, the narrative discourse of the book, while somewhat shocking and peculiar, is not exactly ground breaking and worthy of discussion, but for the perspective from which it is told, namely, from the first person of Meursault himself. For Camus' 'hero', it would seem, is an existentialist and, moreover, may be described as an absurdist.

While existentialism concerns the meaning behind defining one's life and place within the universe, absurdism states that the connection of body and soul, resulting in emotional perception, as well as sensory, is... well, absurd. The two are very closely linked, but the latter, it would seem to me, is somehow scathing of life and its sociological structures, to the point that it would appear to scoff at those foolish enough to take it seriously. In chapter 4, Meursault openly declares that he dislikes policemen and almost enjoys describing the disrespectful behaviour of his friend, Sintes, towards an officer on duty. That he is repulsed by a figure whose job it is to uphold the laws of the land, drawn out by generations before him, is significant in that he is seeking to undermine a symbol of the constraints that surround daily life for every person and into which we are forcibly born.

The existentialist in Meursault begins to shine through as the story progresses and in chapter 5, he says, 'one never changed his way of life'. He would seem to be disregarding the supposed instinct for achievement in life, admitting that he too was ambitious as a student, before realising 'that was pretty futile'. A person's sole 'achievement' should be survival to the day when death will inevitably arrive, but the life through which one must survive is down to luck and fortune and we must accept it for what it is. This itself sounds closely linked to an existentialist theory, loosely termed, 'thrown-ness', i.e. we are 'thrown' into our own lives and there must we make do.

However, Meursault, for all his calm, assured expositions on the meaninglessness of life around him, appears mentally unstable at times. At the vigil of his mother's funeral, (chapter 1), the bright light and white walls are intense and uncomfortable, as he feels himself under the scrutiny of the 'dull' eyes and 'nest of wrinkles' of her elderly friends. He can hear only an eerie sobbing for the entire duration, creating the impression that Meursault himself is experiencing the 'act' of death. Throughout the story, he also describes the stifling heat that disorientates him and which eventually leads him to confronting the Arab man with Sintes' revolver, thus becoming his ultimate downfall. Such mental disturbances may possibly highlight Meursault's isolation from the rest of society, pointing towards his emotional detachment from his sensory perceptions.

Camus' hero, therefore, would seem somewhat uninspiring to his readers. Although commendable in his self-belief and valiance in defending his own morals, his apparent psychological illness appears to undermine this. However, his 'heroic exploits' are not to be fully recognised until the final chapters of the book, when Meursault, condemned to death by the guillotine, comes to understand humankind's insignificance in the grand context of the universe. A chaplain's attempts to turn him to God are bluntly rejected and he realises that his public indifference towards death may serve society in ridding it of the selfish seriousness with which men and women approach a meaningless life. Meursault's death becomes framed as the sacrifice of a martyr, on the scale of the biblical story of Jesus Christ. He, as a character, seems to have evolved in the short space of time from chapter 1 and his disturbed perceptions of death at the vigil, to become a stronger representative of the existentialist, absurdist philosophy.

As a hero, Meursault is a counteractive literary figure, a response to the traditional romanticists of the Enlightenment era and onwards. Camus effectively proposed that the real heroes are those who are passive, rather than active, which is reflected in Meursault's own admiration for a stranger he meets, describing her as a 'robot'. Camus believed that an unfaltering, mechanical approach to life is 'less inauthentic', disregarding strong emotional attachments to anything or anyone as frivolous. The Stranger certainly was a ground breaking piece of literature and anything but ordinary.