My Review of Cambridge

by S.P. Lenza 

It started with a lost railcard,

We weren't sure what to do, 

Turns out my friend keeps a lot of receipts, 

And even an old ticket or two. 

But then soon we were on our way, 

Though we had no particular plan, 

Indeed, we had more serious matters to discuss, 

Like Garden Cities - and the meaning of diocesan. 

Cambridge may not be the warmest place, 

But it's still alright for some, 

Others just keep their cardigans on 

If there's not the slightest glimmer from the sun! 

There're plenty of shops around to visit, 

You can even shop in the dark, 

But I ain't fussed about that or ol' Cath, 

I'd much rather learn about yarg. 

You can try to catch a fairy too, 

Grab one as they pass, 

Though one thing to be sure of is, 

NEVER WALK ON THE GRASS! 

King's College Chapel's a sight to behold, 

Though it's doors are a little stiff, 

But once you're out you can walk the grounds, 

Just mind that cementless bridge. 

You won't get lost, or so you shouldn't, 

So long as you understand the maps, 

But please find time to stop at Auntie's, 

They really do have the best ham! 

And you simply must go punting, 

Something you won't forget, 

Just give your friend a helping hand, 

Make sure they don't get wet. 

There's a place called Don Pasquale, 

Their drinks seem pretty strong, 

So if you go then... yes, watch out for bikes, 

It could all go rather wrong. 

And the FUDGE! - 

Stupendous, marvellous, more than a bit great, 

The only thing to better it... 

Um, sex and tatties on a plate? 

So, how to get back to the station? 

'Back the way you came' - so you'd assume, 

And I agree wholeheartedly... 

... for thinking the park is quicker - that's dangerous to presume... 

I loved my day in Cambridge, 

But there's one thing we didn't do, 

So maybe we'll go back sometime, 

So we can see - at last, hoorah! - my old mate, Winnie the Pooh. 

Staying Ahead of the Game - An Interview with Winchester Knights' Daniel Wakefield

by Stefano Lenza

In a revealing exclusive, reporter Stefano Lenza spoke with Daniel Wakefield, men's captain of Winchester University's Basketball Firsts - nicknamed the Winchester Knights. He speaks candidly about the stresses and strains of leading the team, as well as the pride he takes in overseeing one of their most progressive periods for years.

Click on the link below to listen to the documentary project and find out more.

Shooting for the stars...

Sound effects credited, with thanks, to the following:

http://www.archive.org/details/RockSteady_946

http://www.archive.org/details/NaturalSoundOfBasketball

A Day in the Life... of a Conker

One glorious autumn day, a young photographer noticed a group of small children playing amongst the vibrant leaves strewn across the park. He saw that they were collecting conkers, hoarding them in plastic bags, buckets and pockets, and he was suddenly thrown back into those blustery mornings on the school playground.

What must it be like to see the autumnal world from within one of those tiny shells?

Our young photographer decided to find out. This is what he saw...

Morning high: this horse chestnut tree's new crop looks down on the early passers-by.

Grounded: one conker plummets to earth, finally breaking free of its outer shell.

Palm life: but it's brother is snatched from home...

... and the hands of fate begin to tighten...

... before at last the puppet is put to work...

Is autumn so glorious now...?

And in Conclusion...

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the last book of the module and poses as something rather different in comparison to the others. It's very much an economical account of Wittgenstein's basic propositions, individually setting out and developing all seven of them in his own pursuit of philosophy's logical conclusions.

Looking at several more closely, it seems to me that no other studied philosopher was as fundamentally influenced by the analytic nature of science. Reading the book took me back to those painstakingly slow days in the school labs, noting down my observations and expanding upon them to arrive (sooner or later) at some enlightening evaluation. Perhaps with the exception of the shorter first and last propositions, each one demonstrates a meticulous 'breaking down' of reality itself, whereby the existence of its constituent parts is then explained, possibly becoming broken down even further.

The proposition that most interested me was the third, which stated 'The logical picture of the facts is the thought'. This section revisits some of the issues addressed in Kant's philosophy, particularly alluding towards the topic of phenomena and noumena. To Wittgenstein's mind, the 'existence' of noumena is impossible. He argued that if a human being has the potential to imagine something, then by logic the something must be possible, as thoughts themselves may be considered 'factual' simply due to their very existence within our mental reality. Therefore, in opposition to what Kant proposed, nothing can be unknowable and everything is phenomenal.

As previously discussed, Wittgenstein greatly believed in the influence of language and its role in interpreting and solving the philosophical conundrums that have blighted the brightest minds for millenia, since the time of Socrates. However, his statement as part of the third proposition that language cannot contradict logic seems somewhat bold, through its implication that human beings must therefore represent perfection, considering language as a manmade phenomenon. Nonetheless, I agree that many philosophical debates can almost seem to become lost in translation, seeing as language is so flexible and multifaceted. As the book argues, names themselves cannot be analysed in the search for meaning - they tell us how a thing is, not what it is. They are 'primitive signs', which when incorrectly applied to a certain context, allow true meaning to become misconstrued.

So, without language, History and Context of Journalism could not exist, or else we'd have no debates to discuss! But of course, nor could any other module and here lies the crux of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Language is our method for communicating the world to each other, which by his logic, means language itself is a constituent part of our reality. Nor, however, is language a single entity - it represents many entities - and as the Tractatus states, any single thing, in isolation, is unimportant, but the possibility of many things reveals something about the world and its nature. Therefore, the possibility and the subsequent existence of language, reveals it to be of considerable significance to the past, present and future of man's own existence.

His book, like so many before it, rocked the boat of philosophy - no less for its somewhat openly presumptuous manner in presenting the views of the author as fact. But that's what all philosophers aim to achieve, (as we've so often seen). Each harbours a desire to stamp their own signature on the evolution of human understanding, to present their own arguments and ideas for 'unknotting' the complexities of the subject. And I get the impression that we'll be arguing for some time yet - History and Context will be going strong for years to come.

And in conclusion, I'll just point to the concluding line of the Tractatus; even Wittgenstein, it would seem, acknowledged that language cannot always convey the absolute truth of the universe...

'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent'.

The Power of Language

As we approach the final bends of the module, the interconnectivity between some of our philosophical theories and the practice of modern day journalism is becoming more and more apparent. No more so than when we consider the explorations of our latest philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein.

The Austrian's most celebrated work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, is one of the first book-length studies concerning the relationship between philosophy and language. Published in German in 1921, Wittgenstein argued that all philosophical propositions could be categorised as simple statements conveyed through a set of socially appreciated codes, (i.e. language), which may be analysed as such according only to our existing linguistic structures. From my point of view, he effectively revisits the ontological question; do absolute truths exist in the universe? To use what is in all likelihood a poor analogy, our understanding of the universe is like viewing life through a pair of tinted glasses - everything we learn is derived from our mode of communication, which itself conveys a certain viewpoint upon the propositions that we present. After all, language is a manmade phenomenon, and so all our knowledge must therefore pertain to some form of 'manmadeness' too.

Indeed, Wittgenstein goes so far as to say that the world is language. It's influence is evident on every aspect of our lives and here lies the key idea of the Tractatus, very much reminiscent of Ayer's verification principle; if something, (be it abstract or concrete), cannot be rendered in language, then it cannot exist in the first place.

Naturally, language and subsequently, the politics of language, are vital to the profession of journalism. Wittgenstein's theory on the power of language may in fact be exemplified by its ability to influence (and even control) a population. The Tractatus suggests that the control of facts results in the control of the world, thus potentially serving to explain the rising impact of the modern media on social life. Journalists can mould public opinion, they can access our lives on a number of levels through newspapers, radio and television, the Internet, etc, etc. Of course, to harp back to Nazism, (though I'm no way likening our media to the regime of a dictatorship), Hitler more or less gained possession of German thinking through his stirring, powerful speeches and omnipresent propaganda.

So the Austrian philosopher's theories were put into practice a mere decade after publication. Another man who demonstrated a fascination with language, perhaps like no other journalist did, was George Orwell, particularly so in his 1949 novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four.

Orwell was a disillusioned socialist and anti-communist, as proven in much of his work. Nineteen Eighty-Four follows the story of a society that has been gripped and utterly transformed by a Hitler-esque figure, entirely through the active application of fear within the mind of each citizen and the constant manipulation of words. 'Newspeak', as Orwell names it, not only reconfigures the mindset and beliefs of the dystopia's citizens, (as Nazism did), but also seems to alter reality. 'Doublethink' exemplifies this, which describes the state of believing in two contradictory statements at once. We see then, that langauge does, indeed, control our perceptions of the universe. What is right, wrong or ridiculous is decided by a set of codes that we ourselves determine.

Much of today's advertising is also Orwellian in its nature, loaded with subliminal messaging that is designed to shape our opinions to fit a physchological need for the promoted product or service. Big Brother is not just one person, sitting on a high throne in a remote palace. He is society, himself omnipresent. He is language.

A.J. Ayer and 'The Function of Philosophy'

One of the major pieces of philosophical work of the twentieth century was that of Alfred Jules Ayer, entitled Language, Truth and Logic. Published in 1936, it resembles the formality of a manifesto belonging to the Vienna Circle, which was broken apart shortly before by the emerging Nazi party. The book is recognised as the first significant work to introduce the English-speaking world to logical positivism and, what the school called, the 'verification principle'.

The principle, to my mind, encapsulates the relentless, mechanical logic of the philosophy, stating that no sentence containing a 'formally true proposition' or an 'empirical hypothesis' is 'literally significant', thereby justifying its dismissal as to the use of tenuous metaphysics. Indeed, Ayer dedicates the entirety of his first chapter to the dissemination of metaphysics and its subsequently senseless association with the 'department of logic' that is philosophy. He analyses this ancient misinterpretation as a presupposition of linguistic statements as unequivocal facts. In other words, there has been a shift in the definition of key terms and their real, original meanings, resulting in a loss of understanding through effective mistranslations. It becomes clear to readers that the study of linguistics itself is vital to the school in its attempts to clarify what Ayer calls the 'function' of philosophy.

In his preface, the writer acknowledges that all philosophical propositions are necessary and carry a significance that eliminates any disregard for any credible school of thought. It seems Ayer is attempting heroically to unite the differences between philosophers over thousands of years, which have themselves caused uproar in what may be described as 'the war of philosophy'. From Plato and Aristotle, to Locke, Rousseau and to Nietzsche, their separate thoughts and ideas should be defined by a single cause, namely the need for their profession not to be deductive or speculative, but conversely critical.

According to the following chapter, which explores the issue in more detail, philosophy must also be distinguished from the empirical nature of science, nor does it concern an area of knowledge that lies 'beyond the scope' of empirics. All experience, from Ayer's point of view, is or can be brought under scientific law. As a result, philosophers merely aim to determine the validity of scientific procedures and discoveries, presenting us with the bare facts that may or may not determine our own opinions. Crucially, it should not seek to enquire whether an individual philosophical interpretation is a truth, but which forms of interpretation are most logical. For example, Ayer refers to the philosophy of Descartes, which was founded upon intuitive certainties, in order to negate self-contradictions, (exemplified by the cogito, 'I think, therefore I am'). However, logical positivism would argue, according to the verification principle, that even intuition is not a certainty. Kierkegaard also criticised Descartes, stating he was simply furthering the assumptions of the term, 'I', and its ability to think. Here, we see the outlook of a logical positivist, concerning oneself with the complexities and implications of linguistic statements. In addition, the book itself regards the argument of Hume, echoing that no one event can intrinsically point to the next. Thus, Ayer here sides with the Principle of Uniformity of Nature, belonging to the eighteenth century Scot.

Logical positivism then seems intent on collapsing the contradictions of previous philosophers, seemingly reigniting the purpose of philosophy altogether. Ayer's nonchalance towards the long-disputed 'problem of induction' is typical of this revolutionary thinking, stating that the problem has 'no solution' that satisfies all principles (both formal and empirical) and so it cannot, literally, be a 'genuine' problem.

It seems to me that Ayer believes the revelations of logical positivism make the school unique. But is that not what every philosophy believes? Additionally, the book would appear to imply that all philosophies convey some form of truth, simply due to their existence as 'philosophies'. This in turn suggests that one may conceivably choose to believe in one school over another, however, Ayer seems adamant, like previous philosophers, that logical positivism provides all answers (that are as close to factual truth as is possible) to the aforementioned 'war of philosophy'. Indeed, chapter 2 mentions that philosophy should not seek to 'reassure', but this seems exactly what logical positivism is trying to achieve.

I may be cynical and I am not saying that the school is alone in being hypocritical and contradictory. In fact, I still think all schools are to some degree. So, unfortunately, from my point of view, Ayer may have introduced several more interesting theories and takes on philosophical questions, but he has found no lasting resolution as to what makes one school essentially more 'true' than the next.

Secrets of the Vienna Circle

It sounds like the self-confessed antagonistic society of the next Dan Brown installment, soon to be hitting the shelves of a bookstore near you. However, the Vienna Circle is anything but.

In 1922, German philosopher, Moritz Schlick took charge of a series of long-standing meetings at the University of Vienna, which had begun nearly two decades before, between some of the brightest European minds on science and mathematics. Indeed, the main focus of the meetings was to debate the emerging discoveries and theories of physics, in particular, those of a certain Albert Einstein. The organisation became formerly known as the Circle under Schlick's guidance and set to discussing the philosophical implications of the twentieth century scientific revolutions. From these discussions was born a new school of philosophy that went on to profoundly influence ethical thought for the following decades: logical positivism.

Loosely defined as a school that combines empirical and rationalist views to deduce the relevance of mathematical and linguistic logic in epistemology, logical positivism rejected many of philosophy's previous doctrines. This in many ways reflects the ideology of modernism and that of Nietzsche, radicalising philosophy by dismissing widely accepted beliefs. For example, theories regarding the existence of God and the nature of history were disregarded as meaningless to the well-being of mankind. Thus, I think the school also partly incorporates the existentialist mentality towards actively rebelling against social dogma.

Philosophy, according to the Circle, should not itself be a doctrine for interpreting the world, but a method of scientific interpretation. In a way therefore, it was merely a means of assisting science and the discoveries that it seemed continuously now to be making. Such discoveries involved challenging a set or several sets of previously held facts. Here lies the key to scientific revolution; new theories occasionally contradict not only our beliefs, but universally acknowledged truths. The most famous, of course, was the discovery that Planet Earth was not flat at all - and indeed, as Sinatra famously sung, 'they all laughed at Christopher Columbus when he said the world was round!' In Thomas Kuhn's book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), challenging basic assumptions is referred to as a 'paradigm shift'. Logical positivsm acknowledged that science always has a new theory or concept to discover, which will either challenge the previous paradigm, or lend to developing it. The thought that we, as a race, will never fully understand the world around us is a sad, but also somehow comforting one. After all, where would we go if we knew all there was to know? Humans thrive on striving for new bounds and learning new answers to life's mysteries - why else would we be at university!

Perhaps the most significant strand of logical positivism is the study of meta-ethics, which tackles the question: Can moral claims be true or false?

Those who answer no, are non-cognitivists, believing that moral claims are not statements and so cannot be right or wrong. They may be split into three categories of emotivism (moral claims are just expressions of emotions), prescriptivism (moral claims are mere reasons for action) and expressivism (moral claims are simply one's expressions of widely accepted social norms).

Conversely, those who answer yes, are cognitivists, believing that they are in fact individual statements that specifically reflect the nature of our personalities. They too may be split into three categories of subjectivism (moral claims are true if the individual truly believes in them), intersubjectivism (moral claims are true if the wider community accepts them) and objectivism (moral claims are only true if they are independent of any preferences). This, in turn, raises the question: Are there any truly objective moral values? If you think so, you are an objective moral realist. If not, you are an objective anti-realist, believing all moral claims are false because we as a society assume a set of moral codes, (i.e. what is right and what is wrong), which is a manmade phenomenon and so does not truly exist.

From my point of view, I agree with this last statement. Unless a believer in the Bible, which states that morals are derived from the Divine Ten Commandments, then one must surely agree that mankind itself judges what is right and wrong, underlined by the alternate laws that govern separate societies. Such freedom of will was tragically exemplified by the hijackers of 9/11, who sincerely believed that the West was their sworn enemy and that they were to die for 'the right' cause. In their minds, they were 'freedom fighters'. To us, the West, they were terrorists and committed an act of monstrosity.

Therein lie the problems that face the world today.