The Power of Language

As we approach the final bends of the module, the interconnectivity between some of our philosophical theories and the practice of modern day journalism is becoming more and more apparent. No more so than when we consider the explorations of our latest philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein.

The Austrian's most celebrated work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, is one of the first book-length studies concerning the relationship between philosophy and language. Published in German in 1921, Wittgenstein argued that all philosophical propositions could be categorised as simple statements conveyed through a set of socially appreciated codes, (i.e. language), which may be analysed as such according only to our existing linguistic structures. From my point of view, he effectively revisits the ontological question; do absolute truths exist in the universe? To use what is in all likelihood a poor analogy, our understanding of the universe is like viewing life through a pair of tinted glasses - everything we learn is derived from our mode of communication, which itself conveys a certain viewpoint upon the propositions that we present. After all, language is a manmade phenomenon, and so all our knowledge must therefore pertain to some form of 'manmadeness' too.

Indeed, Wittgenstein goes so far as to say that the world is language. It's influence is evident on every aspect of our lives and here lies the key idea of the Tractatus, very much reminiscent of Ayer's verification principle; if something, (be it abstract or concrete), cannot be rendered in language, then it cannot exist in the first place.

Naturally, language and subsequently, the politics of language, are vital to the profession of journalism. Wittgenstein's theory on the power of language may in fact be exemplified by its ability to influence (and even control) a population. The Tractatus suggests that the control of facts results in the control of the world, thus potentially serving to explain the rising impact of the modern media on social life. Journalists can mould public opinion, they can access our lives on a number of levels through newspapers, radio and television, the Internet, etc, etc. Of course, to harp back to Nazism, (though I'm no way likening our media to the regime of a dictatorship), Hitler more or less gained possession of German thinking through his stirring, powerful speeches and omnipresent propaganda.

So the Austrian philosopher's theories were put into practice a mere decade after publication. Another man who demonstrated a fascination with language, perhaps like no other journalist did, was George Orwell, particularly so in his 1949 novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four.

Orwell was a disillusioned socialist and anti-communist, as proven in much of his work. Nineteen Eighty-Four follows the story of a society that has been gripped and utterly transformed by a Hitler-esque figure, entirely through the active application of fear within the mind of each citizen and the constant manipulation of words. 'Newspeak', as Orwell names it, not only reconfigures the mindset and beliefs of the dystopia's citizens, (as Nazism did), but also seems to alter reality. 'Doublethink' exemplifies this, which describes the state of believing in two contradictory statements at once. We see then, that langauge does, indeed, control our perceptions of the universe. What is right, wrong or ridiculous is decided by a set of codes that we ourselves determine.

Much of today's advertising is also Orwellian in its nature, loaded with subliminal messaging that is designed to shape our opinions to fit a physchological need for the promoted product or service. Big Brother is not just one person, sitting on a high throne in a remote palace. He is society, himself omnipresent. He is language.

A.J. Ayer and 'The Function of Philosophy'

One of the major pieces of philosophical work of the twentieth century was that of Alfred Jules Ayer, entitled Language, Truth and Logic. Published in 1936, it resembles the formality of a manifesto belonging to the Vienna Circle, which was broken apart shortly before by the emerging Nazi party. The book is recognised as the first significant work to introduce the English-speaking world to logical positivism and, what the school called, the 'verification principle'.

The principle, to my mind, encapsulates the relentless, mechanical logic of the philosophy, stating that no sentence containing a 'formally true proposition' or an 'empirical hypothesis' is 'literally significant', thereby justifying its dismissal as to the use of tenuous metaphysics. Indeed, Ayer dedicates the entirety of his first chapter to the dissemination of metaphysics and its subsequently senseless association with the 'department of logic' that is philosophy. He analyses this ancient misinterpretation as a presupposition of linguistic statements as unequivocal facts. In other words, there has been a shift in the definition of key terms and their real, original meanings, resulting in a loss of understanding through effective mistranslations. It becomes clear to readers that the study of linguistics itself is vital to the school in its attempts to clarify what Ayer calls the 'function' of philosophy.

In his preface, the writer acknowledges that all philosophical propositions are necessary and carry a significance that eliminates any disregard for any credible school of thought. It seems Ayer is attempting heroically to unite the differences between philosophers over thousands of years, which have themselves caused uproar in what may be described as 'the war of philosophy'. From Plato and Aristotle, to Locke, Rousseau and to Nietzsche, their separate thoughts and ideas should be defined by a single cause, namely the need for their profession not to be deductive or speculative, but conversely critical.

According to the following chapter, which explores the issue in more detail, philosophy must also be distinguished from the empirical nature of science, nor does it concern an area of knowledge that lies 'beyond the scope' of empirics. All experience, from Ayer's point of view, is or can be brought under scientific law. As a result, philosophers merely aim to determine the validity of scientific procedures and discoveries, presenting us with the bare facts that may or may not determine our own opinions. Crucially, it should not seek to enquire whether an individual philosophical interpretation is a truth, but which forms of interpretation are most logical. For example, Ayer refers to the philosophy of Descartes, which was founded upon intuitive certainties, in order to negate self-contradictions, (exemplified by the cogito, 'I think, therefore I am'). However, logical positivism would argue, according to the verification principle, that even intuition is not a certainty. Kierkegaard also criticised Descartes, stating he was simply furthering the assumptions of the term, 'I', and its ability to think. Here, we see the outlook of a logical positivist, concerning oneself with the complexities and implications of linguistic statements. In addition, the book itself regards the argument of Hume, echoing that no one event can intrinsically point to the next. Thus, Ayer here sides with the Principle of Uniformity of Nature, belonging to the eighteenth century Scot.

Logical positivism then seems intent on collapsing the contradictions of previous philosophers, seemingly reigniting the purpose of philosophy altogether. Ayer's nonchalance towards the long-disputed 'problem of induction' is typical of this revolutionary thinking, stating that the problem has 'no solution' that satisfies all principles (both formal and empirical) and so it cannot, literally, be a 'genuine' problem.

It seems to me that Ayer believes the revelations of logical positivism make the school unique. But is that not what every philosophy believes? Additionally, the book would appear to imply that all philosophies convey some form of truth, simply due to their existence as 'philosophies'. This in turn suggests that one may conceivably choose to believe in one school over another, however, Ayer seems adamant, like previous philosophers, that logical positivism provides all answers (that are as close to factual truth as is possible) to the aforementioned 'war of philosophy'. Indeed, chapter 2 mentions that philosophy should not seek to 'reassure', but this seems exactly what logical positivism is trying to achieve.

I may be cynical and I am not saying that the school is alone in being hypocritical and contradictory. In fact, I still think all schools are to some degree. So, unfortunately, from my point of view, Ayer may have introduced several more interesting theories and takes on philosophical questions, but he has found no lasting resolution as to what makes one school essentially more 'true' than the next.